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Abstract 
 
In this article, we discuss how complexity is viewed in governance network theory. The 
article provides a systematic elaboration of the notion of complexity, distinguishing three types: 
substantive, strategic , and institutional complexity. We argue that dealing with these types of 
complexity in networks is essentially a matter of mutual adaption and cooperation. An 
important explanation for the occurrence of deadlocks, breakthroughs and outcomes is the 
presence and the quality of attempts to manage complex interaction processes in networks. 
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Complexity in Governance Network Theory 
One aspect that is clearly emphasized in most of the literature on governance networks is the 
complexity of the governance processes within these networks. We define governance networks 
as sets of autonomous yet interdependent actors (individuals, groups, organizations) that have 
developed enduring relationships in governing specific public problems or policy programs. The 
complexity of these networks is implied in one of the most important books on networks: Hanf 
and Scharpf’s  Interorganizational Policy Making: Limits to Coordination and Central Control 
(1978). The main argument throughout this seminal work, which is more frequently cited in 
Europe than in the US, is that although the actors who deal with policy problems are 
interdependent to each other for resources, there usually are no governance structures set up that 
deal with these interdependencies.  
Network theory did not start with the publication of Hanf and Scharpf’s book; it has a long 
tradition in both political science and (inter-)organizational science, which goes back to the early 
1960s (for an overview, see Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012). Hanf and Scharpf were, however, among 
the first to use a network perspective to address the “wicked” character of policy problems—a 
term that was first used by Rittel and Webber (1973) and has been the most prominent concept in 
the network studies in the field of public administration. Hanf and Scharpf direct attention to 
where network theory, which at that time differed significantly from many other perspectives in 
public administration: that network theory tends to downplay the central control possibilities of 
policy and decision-making processes and instead emphasizes the complexity of these processes. 
In this article, we explore how complexity is conceptualized and analyzed in the network 
perspective and how it is used to understand and explain decision-making processes within 
networks. 
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Three Types of Complexity in Governance Networks  
Complexity, most of the network literature emphasizes, is not simply caused by the fact that 
multiple actors are present within governance, although this is an important condition. The 
presence of diverse components in a system makes a system complicated, but not complex 
(Gerrits, 2012). Complicatedness can be tamed by the development of knowledge on these 
components and their relationships. Complexity cannot be tamed, however. Complexity reflects 
the dynamic nature of a system’s components and their relationships, making it very hard to 
predict how the system will behave and which outcomes will be produced (Kickert, Klijn, & 
Koppenjan, 1997; Koliba, Meek, & Zia, 2010; Morçöl, 2012; Teisman, van Buuren, & Gerrits, 
2009). Governance networks are multi-actor systems that are not simply complicated, but 
complex. If we look at the wide literature on networks, and the literature that strongly influenced 
the network literature (for an extensive elaboration of the latter literature, see Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2012), we can identify three types of complexity in these networks: substantive 
complexity, strategic complexity, and institutional complexity (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). 
 
Substantive Complexity 
Substantive complexity is about the content of the problem addressed and the nature of 
solutions under consideration. In most of the mainstream Public Administration literature, 
substantive complexity is first of all attributed to the lack of knowledge and information. 
Complexity then is considered to be the result of the absence of data, or the absence of research 
or access thereto. This, so is often argued, is a result of the state of the scientific knowledge 
available at the time, and will be solved by further scientific research and development.  The 
increase in the levels of CO2 in the atmosphere causes the temperature on earth to rise (the 
greenhouse effect) but, as long as it is not known what specific concentrations have what kinds 
of effects, it is impossible to assess the magnitude of this rise in temperatures. 
Substantive complexity however  is not caused only by the absence of information and 
knowledge. What is often more important is that information is available, but its validity is 
contested. Since actors have different perceptions of problems and view them from different 
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frames of reference, they interpret the available information differently (Schön & Rein, 1994; 
Fischer, 2003).  
The presence of different perceptions is really what makes policy problems wicked (Rittel & 
Webber, 1973; Head, 2008; Weber & Khademian, 2008). “Wicked problems” are complex, not 
only because they are  technical in nature, or involve many components or actors, but more so 
because the actors involved in them have different perceptions of their nature and its solutions. 
Often wicked problems can be found in the areas of physical planning, environmental issues, and 
social problems (e.g., elderly care, social welfare issues, crime). The value differences among 
actors and the need for coordinated action among them make the policy problem complex (Head, 
2008; Provan & Kenis, 2008). 
The substantive complexity of wicked problems cannot be resolved by collecting more 
information, because this complexity is not caused by information shortages, but by the lack of a 
joint frame of reference and shared meaning among actors.  As a result, new information can be 
interpreted in different ways. Also, since all actors may engage in information gathering in their 
own way, information may be diverse, conflicting, or hard to understand, which may result in 
information overload and the articulation of conflicting truths. Information gathering in order to 
deal with wicked problems in networks will not reduce complexity, but on the contrary, will 
contribute to it (Klijn &Koppenjan, 2004).  
 
Strategic Complexity 
Most network theorists would argue that governance networks are characterized by strategic 
complexity, in addition to substantive complexity (e.g., Scharpf, 1978, 1997; Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2003). Strategic complexity is a result of the strategic choices actors make when they 
articulate complex problems (Allison, 1971; Kingdon, 1984). Because actors are autonomous 
and networks lack clear hierarchical control forms, each actor choses his/her own strategy. As a 
result, various or even conflicting, strategies may develop around a complex issue (Koppenjan & 
Klijn, 2004). Furthermore, actors anticipate each other’s strategic moves and respond to them 
(Scharpf, 1997). Because of these interactions, it is difficult to predict what strategies actors will 
choose, how strategies will evolve during the process, and how the interactions of these 
strategies will influence the process of problem-solving.  
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Complexity and indeterminacy characterize the interactions within governance networks. It 
is not easy to reduce or eliminate the strategic complexity that is created by these interactions. In 
a complex society characterized by interdependencies (Castells, 1997), actors have discretion to 
make their own choices. Unexpected strategic turns thus are an intrinsic characteristic of 
processes in networks.  
 
Institutional Complexity 
Governance networks are also characterized by institutional complexity. Institutions can be 
defined as sets of rules regulating behavior (Scharpf 1997; Ostrom, 1990). Networks are 
enduring relationships between actors that have resulted in the emergence of sets of rules that 
characterize these relationships.  Each network will have a unique set of rules. Network rules 
may reduce complexity and enhance cooperation, since they make the behaviors of actors more 
predictable. However network rules may compete with other sets of rules stemming from 
informal groups, specific professional roles, organizations, national laws, etc. (March & Olsen, 
1989; Scott, 1995).  If the number of rules grow, become inconsistent, opaque, and not well 
understood, they may generate complexity instead of predictability. What is more, wicked 
problems cut across existing demarcations between organizations, administrative levels, and 
networks. As a result, interactions become more difficult because the behavior of actors, 
representing various networks, will be guided by the different rules and frames of reference, they 
will have other routines and speak another professional language (Ostrom, 2005; Baumgartner & 
Jones, 2009).  
 
Coping with Complexity: The Need for Interaction 
Network theorists suggest that public policymaking and service delivery in governance 
networks require coping with complexity, because problem definitions, solutions, and knowledge 
are contested, strategic interactions of actors are hard to anticipate. All of these factors lead to 
6 
 
unpredictable outcomes, and different institutional regimes produce ambiguity about which rules 
to follow.  
The assumption that underlies network theory is that handling the complexity of difficult 
societal problems requires mutual adaption and cooperation among network actors (Scharpf, 
1978, 1997; Marin & Mayntz, 1991; Rhodes, 1997; Mandell, 2001). As a result of the resource 
dependencies among network actors, some actors may have opportunities to “veto” the decisions 
made by others.  If actors do not negotiate their strategies with others and focus solely on the 
accomplishment of their own goals, by using so-called go-alone strategies, these strategies  are 
likely to lead to blockades and stagnation and hence to inefficient and ineffective decision 
making (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). 
Go-alone strategies in networks generally lead to substantively poor and sub-optimal 
problem solving. They lead to poor solutions because knowledge is dispersed across many actors 
(Head, 2007; Hess & Ostrom, 2006) and therefore these strategies result in solutions that fall 
substantively short in tackling complex problems (Fischer, 2003). They lead to sub-optimal 
solutions because these strategies usually start with the goal of optimizing particular values, but 
often, multiple values are involved in decision making, and solutions must reflect this 
multiplicity of values (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Go-alone strategies tend to optimize particular 
values at the expense of others in the decision-making process and outcome and therefore 
contradict this multiplicity of values.  
Cooperation is necessary in networks, but it is not easy and it comes at a cost. An interaction 
process may stagnate or be blocked because actors have different perceptions, they pursue 
conflicting interests or strategies, they lose interest in an issue, or the transaction costs of 
cooperation are too high (Williamson, 1996). Yet, because of their resource dependencies, actors 
who deal with wicked problems may not have any other choice but to keep on looking for ways 
to cooperate.  
 
Explanations of the Processes and Outcomes of Interactions within Governance Networks 
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Due to their complexity, processes within networks aimed at dealing with wicked problems 
are characterized by stagnation and blockades. An important question, therefore, is how 
stagnations and blockage on the one hand, and breakthroughs and outcomes on the other, can be 
explained. In this section we group the explanations provided by the network literature into three 
categories: cognitive, social, and institutional explanations. In addition, we introduce a fourth 
explanation: the presence and quality of network management.  
 
 
Cognitive Explanations: Substantive Complexity as Cause 
The stagnation in a network may originate from the varying perceptions or frames about the 
nature, causes, and effects of problems and their solutions (Fischer, 2003; Hajer & Wagenaar, 
2003). There may be differences of opinion about the nature of a problem and the quality of the 
available knowledge and solutions. If actors are not aware of the fact that they have different 
perceptions , this may result in misinterpretations and discussion in which they talk past each 
other, without reaching an agreement. In extreme cases, this may result in an enduring “dialogue 
of the deaf” (Wildavsky & Tenenbaum, 1981; Van Eeten, 1999). If actors try to convince one 
another, and involve experts or commission research in order to strengthen their arguments, the 
cognitive differences may be deepened. Under these conditions, debates on environmental 
problems or the construction of infrastructural projects, for instance, may result in a war of 
reports. Scientific knowledge may serve to enhance knowledge conflicts and thus substantive 
complexity, instead of decreasing them (Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons, 2001; Bijker, Bal, & 
Hendriks, 2009). 
A substantive breakthrough is required to break cognitive impasses. Overcoming ambiguity, 
misunderstandings, and differences of opinion requires a convergence of ideas and perceptions 
and the development of a mutual understanding of situations and events. This calls for frame 
reflection and a cross-frame debate, in which problems and solutions are formulated anew 
(Fischer, 2003; Schön & Rein, 1994; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). Cognitive variety in terms of 
solutions, problem definitions, and the scope within which solutions are sought is an important 
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precondition for frame reflection and learning. The turnover of key persons in networks and 
changes in actor constellations may result in social variation with similar effects (Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Another important factor that will help frame reflection and learning is the 
degree to which actors are able to include expertise and organize research in a way that helps to 
identify joint knowledge questions and supports the process of joint sense making and learning 
(Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Head, 2008). This section shows that substantive complexity is not 
the same as the presence of a variety of perceptions. Cognitive variety is actually a condition for 
substantive breakthroughs. It is the absence of a joint frame of reference and a mutual 
understanding that causes stagnations and deadlocks.  
 
Social Explanations: Strategic Complexity as Cause 
Deadlocks and stagnation emerge in networks when the strategies of those actors whose 
resources are indispensable for dealing with the problem are uncoordinated or in conflict, or 
when there is no interaction among actors. Actors are often insufficiently aware of their mutual 
dependencies or they fail to discover a mutual interest. As a result, they choose go-alone 
strategies that bring them into conflict with one another. Governance networks are not “cozy 
places of harmony”; they can be characterized by a high degree of conflict. A lack of dedication 
to solving a problem may also underlie stagnation. Actors may simply not be interested in 
investing their resources. 
Conflicts and stagnation may result in transaction costs and make it difficult to achieve 
coordination (Williamson, 1996; Huxham & Vangen, 2005). A breakthrough can emerge if 
parties are able to align their strategies.  For this to occur, strategic uncertainties must be 
reduced. This may be achieved by the formulation of process agreements with ad hoc rules that 
help to make the behavior of actors more predictables. Furthermore, when one or more actors 
operate as brokers, facilitators, conflict managers, or arbiters, there is an increased chance of 
preventing, or at least limiting, the destructive influence of deadlocks, realizing breakthroughs, 
and making decisions (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Mandell, 2001). If actors succeed in 
formulating a proposal for a solution that links various objectives and offers the perspective of an 
improved situation for most of the actors, a strong incentive may be created to cooperate. A well-
known example of such a win-win-solution in the Netherlands is the breakthrough reached in an 
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enduring conflict on the construction of a road within an urban area: the case of the Sijtwende 
tunnel. The municipality opposed the road that was planned by the central government, since it 
wanted to develop real estate in the area. A private developer suggested that it be allowed to 
build a tunnel. In this case the extra costs for tunnel construction would be partly covered by a 
contribution paid from the profits of real estate development (Koppenjan, 2005).  
Our discussion in this section shows that the presence of many actors is not the same as 
social complexity. It is the lack of coordination mechanisms that causes stagnation and 
deadlocks. The presence of social variety is one of the conditions to realize breakthroughs.  
 
 
Institutional Explanations: Institutional Complexity as Cause  
Stagnation or deadlocks in network processes can be caused by a weakly developed 
institutional structure, i.e., the absence of a clear set of mutually shared rules. Mutually shared 
rules help to reduce the risks involved in participating in interactions in networks. They also 
often have a mitigating effect upon conflicts, and they provide procedures for enhancing 
interaction and managing conflict.  
A weakly developed institutional structure does not imply that there are no institutional 
rules. The problem is more one of institutional complexity, i.e., many different rules coming 
from various institutional backgrounds. For instance, attempts at building new integrated health 
care networks (like initiatives to reduce alcohol use among young people, or to reduce the 
problem of overweight) encounter problems because the initiators have to deal with institutional 
rules from various policy sectors. The incompatibility of orientations, rules, and languages that 
guide the parties’ behaviors makes the process of dealing with wicked problems something like 
building the Tower of Babel (March & Olsen, 1989; Ostrom, 2005).  
Institutional characteristics, such as the nature of rules and trust among actors, can affect 
stagnation and cooperation as well.  Cooperation is more difficult in networks with rigid rules 
than in networks with less rigid rules. Various empirical studies have shown that a high level of 
trust in networks is related to better network performance, indicating that trust is a very 
important for cooperation in networks (Provan, Huang, & Milward, 2009; Klijn, Edelenbos, & 
Steijn, 2010). Networks with a strong institutional structure, such as recognizable rules and 
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relatively strong trust relations between actors, may result in lower transaction costs because 
provisions that further cooperation do not need to be developed from scratch, and parties can rely 
on existing arrangements.  
Institutional breakthroughs occur when dysfunctional rules change or are replaced. As a 
result, new behaviors may emerge, which result in breakthroughs in interaction processes.  Also, 
the creation of new organizational structures and formal rules can enhance the cooperation 
between parties involved and thus, indirectly, help to realize a breakthrough. The creation of new 
rules that guide actors’ behaviors or the creation of more trust is not something that can be 
accomplished in the short run, however. Institutional change is often the result of unintended 
developments or events. (Ostrom, 2005; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). The uncertainty on 
institutional changes is a source of institutional complexity and a cause for stagnations in 
network processes itself.  
 
Network Management as an Explanation 
We propose an additional explanation for the occurrence of deadlocks, breakthroughs, and 
the emergence of policy outcomes in governance networks:  the presence or absence of attempts 
to manage complex interaction processes in networks and the quality of these management 
efforts. Network management can be seen as a way to address the complexity in networks.  It 
may be focused on substantive complexity by enhancing variety, supporting learning processes, 
and arranging joint research. Network management can address strategic complexity by initiating 
and strengthening interactions, arranging relationships, and mediating conflicts. Network 
management may be used to deal with institutional complexity by engaging in institutional 
redesign (changing rules, resource distributions, and organizational relationships).  
Because these three forms of complexity are interrelated, the efforts to manage them cannot 
be isolated from each other. A dialogue of the deaf (cognitive complexity) may be address by 
introducing a new actor (addressing strategic complexity). Institutional complexity may be 
overcome by initiating process agreements (addressing strategic complexity).  
Network management activities may have an incidental, ad hoc nature. It may be a onetime 
response of one of the actors to a deadlock. Network management may also be a continuous and 
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planned activity. Furthermore, network management may be in the hands of one actor, a 
governmental agency or another organization, but it may also be a role that alternates among 
actors. And, last but not least, network management may be contested—both in terms of who 
performs the function and what strategies are performed—thus adding to the complexity that 
characterizes governance networks, rather than reducing it.  
The number of the empirical studies on network management has increased significantly in 
the last 15 years. Many cases studies explored network management strategies (Mandell, 2001; 
Marcussen &Torfing, 2007). Recently published  survey studies show that the employment of 
network management strategies contributes to better network performance (Meier & O’Toole, 
2007; Provan, Huang, & Milward, 2009; Klijn, Steijn, & Edelenbos, 2010; Akkerman & 
Torenvliet, 2011).  
Conclusions 
In this article, we have elaborated on the network perspective of complexity. In particular 
we identified three types of complexity in networks. We also showed how these types of 
complexities can be used as explanations for stagnations and breakthroughs in network 
processes. Attempts at managing complexity do not automatically lead to solving wicked 
problems. They are, rather, focused on achieving conditions under which it becomes possible to 
deal with wicked problems. It involves enhancing learning processes between parties aimed at 
substance, process and institutions. Network management is  focused on improving cognitive 
learning processes, on joint image building, enrichment and goal entanglement, and on strategic 
and institutional learning processes, aimed at enhancing cooperation between parties with 
diverging interests, perceptions and objectives, roles (experts, citizens, users, civil servants, 
entrepreneurs, politicians) and diverging institutional backgrounds. 
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